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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares credit models that incorporate a market component to those that are solely-
customer based. We found that customer-only models understated credit risk during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and do not adequately differentiate between industries. Models that focus 
too heavily on the market can overstate credit risk in times of high volatility. We recommend a two-
factor modelling approach that incorporates both customer and market risk to improve the accuracy 
of credit-risk measurement as well as assist lenders with early risk detection.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has highlighted the importance of understanding credit risk in 
extreme situations. In particular, it has raised widespread concern about the ability of banks to 
accurately measure and provide for credit risk.   
For lenders, measuring credit risk is essential, not only in avoiding bad debts, but also in 
many other respects, including making provisions, setting discretionary authorities for credit 
officers, pricing for risk, setting policies and procedures, maintaining capital adequacy and 
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detecting deteriorating assets at an early stage.  For regulators, it is critical in ensuring prudent 
lending standards and adequate capital.   
Given the indispensability of accurate credit information, banks and regulators face a 
major issue: how to choose between the several available credit-modelling techniques, each of 
which assess a wide range of different criteria but may produce conflicting outcomes. We maintain 
that, in essence, each of these criteria relates to one of two factors – the customer or the market – 
but that each credit model places a different degree of emphasis on them.   
Models that are predominantly customer-based (that is, concerned with the 
creditworthiness of the borrower) usually involve an assessment of the borrowing firm's financial 
position, management and credit history. It is important to understand that most of these models are 
designed to measure credit risk under ‘normal’ or static conditions and do not take into account 
fluctuations in market values of assets. There are several well-known examples in this category, five 
of which are provided here, each with variations in the way they measure customer risk. First, the z 
score developed by Altman (1968; revisited 2000) uses five balance-sheet ratios to predict 
bankruptcy. Second, Moody’s KMV Company (2003) RiskCalc model is based on 11 financial 
measures and provides an estimated default frequency (EDF) for private firms. Third, ratings 
agencies provide credit ratings based on customer creditworthiness. Some of these ratings do 
incorporate an assessment of industry and economic conditions, but they are made at a specific 
point in time and are not designed to ratchet up or down with fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Fourth, CreditMetrics (Gupton, Finger & Bhatia 1997) incorporate credit ratings into a transition 
matrix that measures the probability of transitioning from one rating to another, including the 
probability of default. Fifth, the Basel Accord standardised approach measures corporate credit risk 
for capital adequacy by applying risk weightings on the basis of customers' external credit rating.  
Other models provide a greater focus on market or industry risk than on customer 
creditworthiness; four examples are provided here. First, the Merton/KMV model (Crosbie & Bohn 
2003; Merton 1974) uses a combination of the structure of the customer’s balance sheet and 
fluctuations in the market value of assets to calculate default probabilities. Second, 
CreditPortfolioView (Wilson 1998) uses a similar transition methodology to CreditMetrics, but 
adjusts the transition probability to allow for an industry component derived through 
macroeconomic analysis. Third, iTransition (Allen & Powell 2009b) uses a transition matrix that 
incorporates an industry risk factor derived from equity-price fluctuations. Fourth, Jarrow (2001) 
includes equity prices in the estimation of default probabilities.  
Understanding the interaction between market and credit risk is sufficiently important that 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) set up a task force to examine the link between the 
two. The BIS (2009) task force reported that market and credit risk are driven by the same  
underlying forces, which interact significantly in determining asset values, and that default may be 
affected by fluctuations in these asset values. Similarly, the Bank of England (2008) makes the 
point that not only do asset values fall in times of uncertainty, but rising probabilities of default 
make it more likely that assets will have to be liquidated at market values.  
 Thus, this study addresses the question of whether different economic circumstances 
create differences in outcomes between customer-based credit models and market-based credit 
models. Using an Australian setting, this study compares credit risk before and after the onset of the 
GFC using four different credit-risk models: two that incorporate both customer and market 
measurements (but each to a different degree), and two that are predominantly customer-based.  
The two customer models are the CreditMetrics transition-matrix approach, which we term 
the ‘undiversified transition model’, and the Basel Accord standardised approach of calculating 
credit risk on a risk-weighted asset basis, which we term the ‘Basel model’. The two models that 
include market parameters are the Merton/KMV structural model, which we term the ‘structural 
model’, and the iTransition approach of Allen and Powell, which we term the ‘iTransition model’.  
To ensure a thorough examination of the models across a range of circumstances, we not 
only examine the models in different cycles, but also incorporate measures of different risk 
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extremes within each cycle and apply the measures across a range of industries. These measures 
(explained below) include value at risk (VaR), conditional value at risk (CVaR), probability of 
default (PD) and conditional probability of default (CPD).   
The next section outlines contributions and benefits of the study; sections on risk 
measurements, data and methodology, results and conclusions follow. 
 
2. STUDY SETTING, CONTRIBUTION AND BENEFITS 
 
The study is set in an Australian context because the Australian banking industry is considered to 
have fared far better than its global counterparts over the GFC, and is deemed to have among the 
safest banks in the world (the four major Australian banks are among the only eight global banks 
with AA ratings). The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA 2009a) reports, “The Australian financial 
system has, throughout the crisis period, remained resilient. In aggregate, the Australian banks have 
experienced only a modest decline in profitability. While there has been some diversity of 
performance across banks, increases in loan losses and impairments across the banking system to 
date have been lower than in many other countries”. In 2008, US banks posted a collective loss of 
$12 billion, and the five largest UK banks a collective loss of £20 billion. In contrast, Australian 
banks showed profits of $18 billion. Whilst impaired assets approximately trebled in Australia, the 
US and the UK over the two years to March 2009, the magnitude of Australian impaired losses 
(0.95 per cent of total assets) was much lower than the US (8.8 per cent) and the UK (6.6 per cent) 
(Bank of England 2009; Federal Reserve Bank 2009; Reserve Bank of Australia 2009b). Among the 
RBA's reasons why Australian banks fared better than other banks were a lower exposure to risky 
securities such as sub-prime residential mortgage backed securities, lending standards that were not 
eased to the same degree as elsewhere, and the regulatory environment (particularly the Australian 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code), which places a strong obligation on banks to make responsible 
decisions (Reserve Bank of Australia 2009a).  Overall, Australian banks are perceived as having 
fared much better during the GFC than other global banks, in large part because of the lower credit 
(default) risk in their underlying assets. Against this background, we examine the credit risk faced 
by Australian banks, with the study showing that different models (having varying weightings for 
customers and markets) perceive this credit risk very differently.  
During the GFC, many global banks were not adequately prepared to deal with the extent 
of defaults and increased impaired assets, and were left scrambling for capital and funding just 
when it was most difficult to obtain. This study examines credit risk before and during the GFC in 
the Australian setting, using a variety of customer- and market-based models. The study is intended 
to provide a number of benefits to banks. First, by comparing these models' risk measurements to 
actual changes in impaired assets, the study shows the inherent shortfalls of models that are biased 
towards either customers or markets. The study highlights the importance of having a two-factor 
(customer and market) approach to credit-risk measurement, which in turn can help banks 
determine provision and capital needs.  
Second, and related to the previous point, this study aims to help banks gain a greater 
understanding of the market-based component of credit risk; this will, in turn, help them determine 
what capital buffers might be required for downturns. Whilst capital requirements are stipulated by 
regulators (on the basis of the Basel Accords), banks also need to manage their own capital needs, 
which may be above the regulatory minimum. According to the International Monetary Fund, the 
Basel system “does emphasise that banks should address volatility in their capital allocation and 
define strategic plans for raising capital that take into account their needs, especially in a stressful 
economic environment”. As measured by a market approach (such as the structural model), capital 
decreases during a downturn due to declining market-based asset values; under these circumstances, 
as pointed out by the Bank of England (2008),  a mark-to-market approach provides a measure of 
how much capital needs to be raised to restore confidence in a bank’s market capitalisation.  
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Third, the study includes unique modelling techniques, which incorporate CVaR and 
market-based industry factors (the iTransition model) into credit modelling. These were developed 
by the authors using pre-GFC data (Allen & Powell 2009a, 2009b), and this study examines the 
performance of these metrics during the GFC.   The CVaR techniques help banks better understand 
and measure credit risk in extreme circumstances, such as those experienced during the GFC. The 
iTransition model, which incorporates both customers and markets, can (as shown in this study) 
provide banks with a more balanced approach to credit-risk measurement than the solely customer-
based models (which we show can underestimate credit risk in extreme circumstances) and solely 
market-based models (which we show can overestimate credit risk in extreme circumstances).   
   
3. VALUE AT RISK (VAR) AND PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT (PD) 
  
VaR is a well-understood and widely used metric for measuring market risk; it has become 
increasingly popular for measuring credit risk. VaR measures potential losses over a specific period 
within a given confidence level. Credit models that incorporate VaR include CreditMetrics (Gupton 
et al. 1997), CreditPortfolioView (Wilson 1998), and iTransition (Allen & Powell 2009b). 
However, the use of VaR has been criticised by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1997; 1999), as 
it does not satisfy mathematical properties such as subadditivity. Perhaps the biggest shortfall of 
VaR is that it excludes losses beyond VaR. Therefore, if a 95 per cent confidence level is selected, 
the extreme 5 per cent of losses are excluded. This is an important weakness in a credit context, as it 
is precisely in these extreme circumstances that firms are most likely to fail.  
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is a measure initially used in the insurance industry for 
determining extreme returns (those beyond VaR). The metric has been shown by Pflug (2000) to be 
a coherent risk measure without VaR's undesirable properties. CVaR has been applied to portfolio-
optimisation problems by Alexander and Baptista (2003), Alexander et al. (2003), Andersson et.al 
(2000), Birbil et al. (2009), Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002), Rockafellar et al. (2006), and 
Menoncin (2009) and Uryasev and Rockafellar (2000). CVaR has also been explored as a market- 
and credit-risk measure by Allen and Powell (2009a, 2009b), who found that CVaR yields results 
consistent to VaR when used to measure pre-GFC Australian industry risk rankings. Using CVaR, 
Powell and Allen (2009) also found that industries that had been risky before the GFC, from both a 
credit- and a market-risk perspective, were not the same industries that were risky during the GFC. 
CVaR studies in a credit context are still in their infancy, and aside from the studies by Allen and 
Powell there has been little application of CVaR in Australia.  
As opposed to VaR, the Merton/KMV model uses Distance to Default (DD) and 
Probability of Default (PD) as measures of credit risk. Default is considered to be the point where a 
firm’s liabilities exceed asset values. (These metrics are more fully explained in a later section of 
this paper).  The model is termed a structural model, as DD depends on the structure of the firm’s 
balance sheet as well as fluctuations in the market value of assets.   Examples of studies using 
structural methodology for varying aspects of credit risk include predictive value and validation 
(Bharath & Shumway 2008; Stein 2007), fixed-income modelling (D'Vari, Yalamanchili & Bai 
2003),  and  the effect of default risk on equity returns (Chan, Faff & Kofman 2008; Gharghori, 
Chan & Faff 2007; Vassalou & Xing 2002). 
 
  
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
Data is divided into two periods: pre-GFC and GFC. Our pre-GFC period includes the seven years 
from January 2000 to December 2006. This seven-year period aligns with Basel Accord advanced-
model credit-risk requirements. Our GFC period includes January 2007 to June 2009. For our 
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Merton/KMV model, which requires equity prices, the study includes entities listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) All Ordinaries Index (All Ords) for which equity prices and 
Worldscope balance-sheet data are available in Datastream. Entities with less than 12 months' data 
in either of the two periods, or industries with fewer than five companies, are excluded. We 
consider this to be a fair representation of Australian listed entities, given that the All Ords includes 
more than 90 per cent of listed Australian companies by market capitalisation, and our data sample 
includes approximately 90 per cent of All Ords entities. The other models examined all require 
external ratings. For these models (Basel, Undiversified Transition and iTransition), we use all 
Australian entities with a Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s rating (not all companies have an external 
rating, and to ensure a reasonable number of companies are included in each industry, we exclude 
any industries with fewer than five companies; these are Automobiles and Components, Capital 
Goods, Commercial Services and Supplies, Food and Staples Retailing, Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology, Retailing and Technology). Although this reduces the number industries, it 
nonetheless provides 14 industries for analysis using these models. For standardisation, all Moody’s 
ratings are mapped to Standard & Poor's (Crosbie & Bohn 2003). Correlation (diversification) 
among assets in the portfolio is not calculated, as we are not calculating the risk measures for 
investment purposes, and do not need to show the effect of portfolio diversification. Industry risk 
measurement (VaR, CVaR, DD or CDD) for each model is calculated on each firm in each industry, 
rather than an industry index, with the industry portfolio simply showing the weighted average of 
these firms to allow comparison across industries. 
  
Methodology Model 1: Structural Model 
 
We use the Merton/KMV approach to estimating default, modifying the calculation to 
incorporate a CVaR component (which we term CPD, as the model uses probability of default 
rather than VaR). The structural-model point of default is where the firm’s debt exceeds asset 
values. KMV (Crosbie & Bohn 2003), in modelling defaults using their extensive worldwide  
database of over 250,000 company-years of data and over 4,700 incidents of default, finds that in 
general firms do not default when asset values reach total liability book values. Many continue to 
trade and service their debts at this point, as the long-term nature of some of their liabilities 
provides some breathing space. KMV finds that the default point – the asset value at which the firm 
will default – generally lies somewhere between total liabilities and current, or short-term, liabilities 
(modelling evidence from their extensive database shows approximately halfway). Thus KMV uses 
current debt plus half of long-term debt as the default point. Distance to default (DD) and 
probability of default (PD) are measured as 
T
TFV
DD
V
V

 )5.0()/ln( 2
        
 (1) 
 
)( DDNPD           
 (2) 
where 
V = market value of firm’s assets 
F = face value of firm’s debt (in line with KMV, this is defined as current liabilities 
plus one half of long-term debt)  
 µ  = an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets  
 N = cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
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Of all the well-known credit models, the Merton/KMV approach provides the strongest 
focus on the market, with fluctuations in the market value of assets forming a core component of the 
model. On the other hand, a comparison to the customer models in this study, which are based on 
external ratings incorporating a vigorous customer assessment, highlights the fact that the 
structural-model customer component is very narrow, focusing only on the distance between asset 
values and debt (solvency). In an Australian setting, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) website contains papers (Sy 2007, 2008),  arguing that the Merton/KMV approach suffers 
from incomplete causality, especially in regard to serviceability: technical insolvency, as measured 
by the relationship between debt and equity, is not a sufficient condition for default of secured 
loans, as many technically insolvent entities continue to make debt repayments.    
It should be noted that KMV finds that the PD values arising from the normal distribution 
are very small, and hence use their own extensive database of defaulting entities to derive an 
Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) from DD values, to which we do not have access. For this 
reason, we will report DD values only, as opposed to PD values. This has no impact on our industry 
rankings, as a riskier DD ranking also has a riskier PD ranking. First, we obtain daily equity returns 
for each entity, and calculate the standard deviation of the logarithm of price relatives.  Following 
the estimation, iteration and convergence procedure outlined by Allen and Powell (2009a), Bharath 
and Shumway (2009) and KMV (2008) we obtain asset values and asset returns. These figures are 
then applied to the DD and PD calculations in Equations 1 and 2. We measure µ as the mean of the 
change in lnV as per Vassalou and Xing  (2002). In accordance with KMV, debt is measured as 
current liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities. 
 We define conditional distance to default (CDD) as being DD on the condition that 
standard deviation of asset returns exceeds standard deviation at the 95 per cent confidence level, 
i.e. the worst 5 per cent of asset returns. We term the standard deviation of the worst 5 per cent of 
returns for each period as CStdev, which we then substitute into Equation 1 to obtain a conditional 
DD: 
TVCStdev
TVFVCDD
)25.0()/ln(  
      
  (3) 
Methodology Model 2: Basel Model 
 
The Basel standardised model requires that 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets be held as capital for 
credit risk. Whilst the Basel model is used for calculating the capital requirements of financial 
firms, it is based on measuring the risk of the underlying customers, who come from a range of 
industries. We use our portfolio of all Australian rated entities to calculate capital requirements for 
each industry.  Risk weightings used to calculate credit risk for corporate customers are as follows: 
Rating AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BB+ to 
BB- 
Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
Risk 
weighting 
20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
 
Methodology Model 3: Undiversified Transition Model 
 
This model is based on the probability (ρ) of a bank customer transitioning from one grade to 
another, as shown in the following BBB example: 
BBB ρAAA ρAA ρA ρBBB ρBB ρB ρCCC/C ρD 
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External raters such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) provide transition 
probabilities for each grading; we use the S&P (2008) global-transition probabilities. We exclude 
non-rated categories and adjust the remaining categories on a pro-rata basis, as is the practice of 
CreditMetrics (Gupton et al. 1997). The sum of all probabilities must equal 1. 
We follow CreditMetrics methodology as described in the following paragraphs. The 
model obtains forward-zero curves for each rating category (based on risk-free rates) expected to 
exist in a year’s time. Using the zero curves, the model calculates the market value (V) of the loan, 
including the coupon, at the one-year risk horizon. Effectively, this means estimating the change in 
credit spread that results from migration from one rating category to another, then calculating the 
present value of the loan at the new yield to estimate the new value. The following example values 
a five-year loan, paying a coupon of 6 per cent, where r = the risk-free rate (the rate on government 
bonds) and s = the spread between a government bond and corporate bonds of a particular category, 
say AA (Gupton et al. 1997). 
6       (4) 
The above is calculated for each rating category (yields for government and corporate 
bonds can be obtained from RBA or other central bank websites). Probabilities in the transition 
table (in this case obtained from the S&P global transition table) are multiplied by V for each rating 
category to obtain a weighted probability. Based on the revised probability table, VaR is obtained 
by calculating the probability-weighted portfolio variance and standard deviation (σ), then 
calculating VaR using a normal distribution (for example 1.645σ for a 95 percent confidence level).  
We extend this methodology (Gupton et al. 1997) to calculate CVaR by using the lowest 5 
per cent of ratings for each industry; we call this ‘Analytical CVaR’. 
CreditMetrics (see also Allen & Powell 2009b) use Monte Carlo modelling as an alternate 
approach to estimating VaR. Transition probabilities and a normal distribution assumption are used 
to calculate asset thresholds (Z) for each rating category as follows: 
 Pr(Default)= Φ(ZDef/σ)        
Pr(CCC) = Φ(ZCCC/σ) - Φ(ZDef/σ)     
 (5) 
 and so on, where Φ denotes the cumulative normal distribution, and 
 ZDef  = Φ
-1σ         
 (6) 
Scenarios of asset returns are generated using a normal distribution assumption. These 
returns are then mapped to ratings using the asset thresholds. A return falling between rating 
thresholds will correspond to the rating threshold immediately above it. In line with this 
methodology, we generate 20,000 returns for each customer from which a portfolio distribution and 
VaR are calculated. We extend this methodology (1999) to calculate CVaR by obtaining the worst 5 
per cent of the 20,000 returns for each industry; we call this ‘Monte Carlo CVaR.’  
 
Methodology Model 4: iTransition Model 
 
CreditPortfolioView, a variation on the undiversified transition model, incorporates an adjustment 
to transition probabilities based on industry and country factors calculated from macroeconomic 
variables.  This model recognises that customers of equal credit rating may transition differently 
depending on their industry risk. A study by APRA (1999) showed that banks did not favour using 
macroeconomic factors in their modelling due to the complexities involved. Our own iTransition 
model (Allen & Powell 2009b) uses the same framework as CreditPortfolioView, but incorporates 
equity VaR instead of macroeconomic variables to derive industry adjustments. This is done by 
calculating market VaR for each industry, then calculating the relationship between market VaR 
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and credit risk for each industry, using the Merton model to calculate the credit-risk component. 
These factors are used to adjust the model as follows, using a BBB-rated loan example:  
BBB ρAAAi ρAAi ρAi ρBBBi ρBBi ρBi ρCCC/Ci ρDi 
 
The incorporation of industry market factors into the iTransition model gives it a higher 
market focus than the Basel or undiversified Transition models. However, as external customer 
ratings are still entrenched in the iTransition model, it retains a greater balance between customers 
and markets than the heavily market-weighted structural model.   
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Structural Model Results 
Table 1 
DD and CDD Results – Structural Model 
 
DD (measured by number of standard deviations) is calculated using Equation 1. CDD is 
based on the worst 5 per cent of asset returns and is calculated using Equation 3. Figures for GFC are 
based on daily returns for 2007 to mid-2009. Figures for pre-GFC  incorporate seven years of data to 
2006.  A negative movement means a deterioration in DD or CDD during the GFC as compared to 
pre-GFC. Data is sorted in order of GFC CDD from lowest to highest risk. 
 
 
Table 1 shows DD and CDD values; Table 2 gives their rankings. Real Estate, Diversified 
Financials and Banks show the greatest declines in CDD rankings. 
 
The structural model essentially consists of two key components that influence DD: the 
capital of the borrower (a customer component) and asset-value fluctuations (a market component). 
These in turn are affected by share-price fluctuations.  To illustrate the relative importance of the 
customer-versus-market component of our results, Table 3 shows the relative equity (capital) of 
each industry as a proxy for the customer component, and the CVaR of the equities as a proxy for 
the market component. To obtain CVaR, we measure the equity returns for each day and calculate 
the standard deviation of the price relatives logarithm for the worst 5 per cent of returns.    
 
 
DD DD CDD CDD
Pre-GFC GFC Movement Pre-GFC GFC Movement
Healthcare Equipment & Services 8.86 10.66 1.79 5.86 3.11 -2.74
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 9.44 8.49 -0.95 5.06 2.72 -2.33
Utilities 13.93 8.64 -5.28 6.17 2.62 -3.55
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 7.64 6.67 -0.97 4.54 2.14 -2.40
Telecommunication Services 9.40 7.07 -2.33 6.59 2.13 -4.46
Energy 9.52 6.50 -3.01 5.36 1.84 -3.54
Food & Staples Retailing 10.06 6.14 -3.92 5.33 1.82 -3.53
Media 9.97 5.62 -4.35 5.00 1.78 -3.25
Consumer Durables & Apparel 9.27 5.23 -4.04 5.16 1.61 -3.52
Technology 5.64 5.22 -0.42 3.84 1.58 -2.27
Commercial Services & Supplies 7.80 5.23 -2.57 4.53 1.48 -3.02
Retailing 7.12 4.40 -2.71 4.35 1.44 -2.89
Transportation 8.31 4.75 -3.56 4.31 1.41 -2.87
Metals & Mining 8.50 3.92 -4.59 5.86 1.12 -4.75
Real Estate 11.54 3.35 -8.19 6.26 0.93 -5.32
Capital Goods 8.49 3.07 -5.42 4.99 0.82 -4.17
Insurance 3.70 2.12 -1.59 3.38 0.60 -2.78
Banks 8.26 1.18 -7.07 5.19 0.39 -4.81
Automobiles & Components 5.80 1.09 -4.71 3.26 0.27 -2.99
Diversified Financials 11.65 0.59 -11.06 5.17 0.16 -5.01
All 8.54 4.37 -4.17 4.95 0.56 -4.39
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Table 2 
DD and CDD Rankings – Structural Model 
The table provides sector rankings for the outputs in Table 1. Sectors are ranked from 1 
(lowest risk) to 20 (highest risk). Negative movement indicates deterioration in ranking. Positive 
movement does not mean that the DD or CDD necessarily improved, but that the ranking 
improved relative to other industries.  Data is sorted in order of GFC CDD from lowest to highest 
risk. 
 
  
The market factor shown in Table 3 ranges from 0.5 to 1.7. The customer factor ranges 
from 0.8 to 4.1. The larger customer range is brought about by the financial sector (Banks, 
Insurance, and Diversified Financials). Excluding these gives a much narrower range. 
Banks traditionally have lower equity structures than other industries, with loans primarily 
funded by deposits as opposed to equity. This means they have a lower distance to travel to default 
than other industries. The market-risk component as measured by CVaR in this instance is highest 
for Diversified Financials. Table 4 splits these into risk bands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DD DD CDD CDD
Pre-GFC GFC Movement Pre-GFC GFC Movement
Healthcare Equipment & Services 10 1 9 4 1 3
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 7 3 4 11 2 9
Utilities 1 2 -1 3 3 0
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 16 5 11 14 4 10
Telecommunication Services 8 4 4 1 5 -4
Energy 6 6 0 6 6 0
Food & Staples Retailing 4 7 -3 7 7 0
Media 5 8 -3 12 8 4
Consumer Durables & Apparel 9 10 -1 10 9 1
Technology 19 11 8 18 10 8
Commercial Services & Supplies 15 9 6 15 11 4
Retailing 17 13 4 16 12 4
Transportation 13 12 1 17 13 4
Metals & Mining 11 14 -3 5 14 -9
Real Estate 3 15 -12 2 15 -13
Capital Goods 12 16 -4 13 16 -3
Insurance 20 17 3 19 17 2
Banks 14 18 -4 8 18 -10
Automobiles & Components 18 19 -1 20 19 1
Diversified Financials 2 20 -18 9 20 -11
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Table 3 
Relative Market and Customer Risk 
 
The table shows the relative risk for the market (CVaR), 
customer (capital) and CDD for the GFC period. The figures are 
calculated as industry risk/average portfolio risk. Thus, a value of 1 
means that the industry risk is in line with the average overall 
portfolio risk, 2 means that the industry risk is double the average 
overall portfolio risk and 0.5 means the industry risk is half the 
average overall portfolio risk. Data is sorted in order of GFC CDD 
from lowest to highest risk. 
Market Customer CDD 
Healthcare Equipment & Services 0.8 0.9 0.5 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0.7 1.0 0.5 
Utilities 0.7 1.2 0.6 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 1.0 0.8 0.7 
Telecommunication Services 0.5 1.0 0.7 
Energy 1.3 0.8 0.8 
Food & Staples Retailing 0.7 0.9 0.8 
Media 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Cons. Durables, Apparel, Services 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Technology 1.2 0.8 0.9 
Commercial Services & Supplies 1.1 0.9 1.0 
Retailing 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Transportation 1.0 1.1 1.0 
Metals & Mining 1.3 0.8 1.4 
Real Estate 1.3 1.0 1.6 
Capital Goods 1.2 0.8 1.8 
Insurance 0.9 2.2 2.5 
Banks 0.7 4.1 3.9 
Automobiles & Components 1.3 1.2 5.6 
Diversified Financials 1.7 1.9 9.3 
 
 
Table 4 clearly illustrates which component – customer or market – is driving the CDD, 
with different components driving different industries. High risk on both fronts, such as in 
Diversified Financials and Automobiles & Components, results in high overall high risk as 
measured by CDD. Whilst banks and insurance companies have lower market risk, the high capital 
risk component causes high CDD risk. Energy has high market risk but low customer risk, resulting 
in a medium-low CDD risk. Which component has the greatest influence on CDD? We use the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient to measure correlation between market risk and CDD, and 
between customer risk and CDD. The result is the same  for the data both before and during the 
GFC. Association between CDD rankings and market rankings are significant at the 95 per cent 
level, whereas association between customer rankings and CDD rankings is not. This indicates that 
the market measure has a greater influence on CDD rankings than the customer measure. Figure 1 
shows change in CDD rankings from pre-GFC to GFC, as measured in Table 2. The largest 
deterioration in rankings is experienced by Real Estate, Diversified Financials and Banks. This is 
not surprising, given the problems experienced by the financial sector during the GFC.  
  
Allen & Powell: Customers and Markets 
 
67 
 
Table 4 
Risk Categories – Structural Model 
 
The table shows the relative risk for the GFC period in categories 
of low (20th percentile), medium low (>20th to 40th percentile, medium (>40th 
to 60th percentile), medium-high (>60th to 80th percentile) and high (> 80th 
percentile). Data is sorted in order of GFC CDD from lowest to highest risk. 
Market Customer CDD 
Healthcare Equipment & Services Med-low Med-low Low 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco Low Med-high Low 
Utilities Low Med-high Low 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Med Low Low 
Telecommunication Services Low Med Med-low 
Energy High Low Med-low 
Food & Staples Retailing Low med-low Med-low 
Media Med Med med-low 
Cons. Durables, Apparel, Services Med-low Low Med 
Technology Med-high Low Med 
Commercial Services & Supplies Med-high Med Med 
Retailing Med Med Med 
Transportation Med Med-high Med-high 
Metals & Mining High Med-low Med-high 
Real Estate Med-high Med-high Med-high 
Capital Goods Med-high Med-low Med-high 
Insurance Med-low High High 
Banks Med-low High High 
Automobiles & Components High High High 
Diversified Financials High High High 
 
Figure 1 
Change in CDD Rankings – Structural Model 
 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, Allen and Powell (2009a) found significant correlation 
between those industries that are risky from a market perspective (share-price volatility) and those 
that are risky from a credit perspective (PD as measured by the Merton model). The authors (Powell 
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& Allen 2009)  also found that there continues to be a strong relationship (99 per cent confidence) 
between market- and credit-risk rankings during the GFC. However, they found no association 
between CPD industry rankings during the GFC and those pre-GFC, showing that relative risk 
between sectors changes with different economic conditions. 
 
Basel Model Results 
 
Table 5 shows ratings for all entities rated externally by S&P and Moody’s, and the risk weightings 
that apply according to the Basel II Standardised model. The table shows that there are not a vast 
number of rating changes after the onset of the GFC. A bank holding this portfolio of assets would 
see its capital increase only marginally, from 3.08 per cent to 3.31 per cent; this indicates that 
according to the Basel model, there has been negligible change in credit risk since the onset of the 
GFC. 
 
Table 5 
Risk Weightings and Capital Requirements 
 
Column 1 shows the external credit rating. Risk weightings in 
Column 2 reflect Basel requirements for corporate counterparties. Capital 
requirement is measured as 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets in line with 
Basel. This is shown as a percentage of total assets in the final row of the table. 
 
Rating Risk 
Weighting 
Pre-GFC 
% of portfolio in 
this category 
GFC 
% of portfolio in 
this category 
AAA to AA- 20% 62.83% 59.86% 
A+ to A- 50% 22.23% 21.56% 
BB+ to BB- 100% 14.94% 18.56% 
Below BB- 150% 0% 0.02% 
Capital Required as 
% of Total Assets 
 3.08% 3.31% 
    
We have not shown an industry split for this model, as it is based on external ratings and 
would therefore have the same relative industry risk as the undiversified transition model shown 
below. For example, an AA rating for a mining borrower carries the same capital requirement under 
the Basel standardised model as an AA rating for a retailer. The same applies to the undiversified 
transition model, where VaR for an AA retailer is the same as VaR for an AA miner.  Whilst the 
two models have the same relative industry risk, it is still necessary to examine both models 
separately, as they have very different absolute outcomes (the Basel model being based on capital 
requirements and the undiversified transition model being the calculation of potential value at risk 
and conditional value at risk, which measures extreme risk). The Basel model has universal 
application, being used by more than 100 countries, including all G20 countries.  
  
Undiversified Transition Matrix Results 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show that whilst there has been an increase in overall default risk since the GFC, this 
increase is very small in comparison to that shown by the structural model. The simpler Analytical 
CVaR model of Powell and Allen shows very similar results to the more complex Monte Carlo 
modelling option.   
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Table 6 
VaR and CVaR – Undiversified Transition Matrix Pre-GFC 
 
The first three columns show daily VaR and CVaR figures for 
the undiversified transition model, with the final three columns showing 
rankings. A ranking of 1 represents the lowest risk and 14 the highest.  
Calculation of Analytical CVaR and Monte Carlo CVaR is as described 
earlier in this paper. Data has been sorted on Analytical CVaR from 
lowest to highest risk. 
 
 
There is no major change in relative risk ratings between pre-GFC and GFC. Changes in 
ratings are not significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence using the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient. Figure 2 shows a much flatter profile of CDD ranking shifts than those associated with 
the structural model in Figure 1. This is because the transition model, unlike the structural model, 
has not factored in the relative shifts in industry market asset values. Indeed, there is no relation 
between the industry shifts identified by the transition model and those identified by the structural 
model. For example, one of the greatest improvements shown in the transition model is in Metals 
and Mining; in contrast, the structural model shows significant deterioration in that sector. To give 
another example, the undiversified transition model shows Banks (no change) and Diversified 
Financials (improvement) to fare much better in terms of ranking shifts than does the the structural 
model, in which both show significant deterioration. 
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Banks 0.0145 0.0131 0.0135 1 1 1
Diversified Financials 0.0289 0.0669 0.0658 5 8 8
Energy 0.0506 0.0579 0.0598 8 7 7
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0.0743 0.1787 0.1730 13 14 14
Healthcare 0.0929 0.1588 0.1629 14 13 13
Insurance 0.0207 0.0237 0.0232 3 4 4
Media 0.0533 0.0674 0.0722 10 9 10
Metals & Mining 0.0209 0.0212 0.0204 4 2 2
Other Consumer Discretionary 0.0739 0.1417 0.1412 12 12 12
Other Materials 0.0592 0.0685 0.0704 11 10 9
Real Estate 0.0328 0.0470 0.0454 6 6 5
Telecommunication Services 0.0206 0.0225 0.0222 2 3 3
Transportation 0.0512 0.0785 0.0805 9 11 11
Utilities 0.0354 0.0456 0.0459 7 5 6
Total 0.0242 0.0342 0.0343
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Table 7 
VaR and CVaR  Undiversified Transition Matrix GFC 
 
The table shows the same items as Table 6, but for the GFC 
period rather than the pre-GFC. Data has been sorted on Analytical CVaR 
from lowest to highest risk. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Change in CDD Rankings – Undiversified Transition Model 
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Banks 0.0202 0.0253 0.0166 1 1 1
Insurance 0.0279 0.0350 0.0307 2 2 2
Telecommunication Services 0.0308 0.0386 0.0342 3 3 3
Real Estate 0.0361 0.0453 0.0484 4 4 5
Diversified Financials 0.0367 0.0460 0.0736 5 5 10
Utilities 0.0380 0.0476 0.0463 6 6 4
Metals & Mining 0.0454 0.0570 0.0516 7 7 6
Energy 0.0481 0.0602 0.0538 8 8 7
Transportation 0.0520 0.0651 0.0723 9 9 9
Media 0.0538 0.0674 0.0697 10 10 8
Other Consumer Discretionary 0.0647 0.0811 0.1180 11 11 11
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0.0712 0.0892 0.1577 12 12 13
Healthcare 0.0743 0.0932 0.1242 13 13 12
Other Materials 0.0915 0.1147 0.1801 14 14 14
Total 0.0306 0.0396 0.0363
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iTransition Results 
 
Table 8 
VaR and CVaR – iTransition GFC 
 
The first three columns show daily VaR and CVaR for the 
iTransition model, with the final three columns showing rankings. A 
ranking of 1 represents the lowest risk and 14 the highest.  Calculation 
of Analytical CVaR and Monte Carlo CVaR are as described earlier in 
this study. Data has been sorted on Analytical CVaR from lowest to 
highest risk. 
 
 
We use the same start point as for the undiversified model (i.e. pre-GFC position, as in 
Table 6). Table 8 shows the GFC position using iTransition methodology described earlier. 
iTransition shows a much greater increase in VaR (to 0.08) and CVaR (0.09) than the undiversified 
model (0.03 and 0.04, respectively). This shows that the industry profile affects the results. As there 
is a large component of financial-sector assets among rated entities, and these sectors have 
experienced a large reduction in the market value of their assets, the increase in VaR and CVaR is 
expected, and the model is doing its job in identifying increased credit risk.  
There is association between VaR (and CVaR) rankings before and during the GFC using 
the undiversified transition matrix at a 99 per cent confidence level. There is no association between 
VaR (and CVaR) rankings before and during the GFC using the iTransition model at a 95 per cent 
confidence level. 
Figure 3 shows similar deterioration in rankings to those identified by the structural model 
for the financial industry (Banks, Insurance, Diversified Financials and Real Estate). The shifts in 
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Energy 0.0647 0.0811 0.0898 1 1 1
Metals & Mining 0.0648 0.0812 0.0919 2 2 2
Transportation 0.0658 0.0825 0.1000 3 3 4
Media 0.0660 0.0828 0.0921 4 4 3
Utilities 0.0667 0.0837 0.1028 5 5 5
Real Estate 0.0677 0.0849 0.1046 6 6 6
Telecommunication Services 0.0682 0.0855 0.1087 7 7 7
Insurance 0.0712 0.0892 0.1171 8 8 9
Other Consumer Discretionary 0.0714 0.0896 0.1261 9 9 11
Diversified Financials 0.0734 0.0920 0.1232 10 10 10
Healthcare 0.0749 0.0940 0.1118 11 11 8
Banks 0.0801 0.1004 0.1408 12 12 12
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0.0882 0.1106 0.1491 13 13 13
Other Materials 0.0950 0.1191 0.1514 14 14 14
Total 0.0762 0.0921 0.0955
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rankings for iTransition (-11 to +7) are not as pronounced as for the structural model (-13 to +10), 
but are not nearly as flat as the undiversified transition model.  
Figure 3 
Change in CVaR Rankings – iTransition Model 
 
 
Overall Summary of Results 
 
The summary in Table 9 highlights the vast difference in outcomes between the customer- and 
market-based models.  
The customer-based Basel and undiversified transition models show very little change in 
credit risk with only nominal changes in capital requirements (Basel model) and VaR/CVaR 
(undiversified transition model). There is no significant change in industry rankings. The market-
based structural model shows large increases in DD and CDD, and the market-based iTransition 
model shows much higher increases in credit risk than the undiversified transition model. 
The customer-based models show no significant shift in relative industry rankings. There is 
correlation between those industries that were risky prior to the GFC and those industries that are 
risky during the GFC. The market-based models show that those industries that were risky prior to 
the GFC are not the same as those that are most risky during the GFC. 
How do these outcomes compare with the actual credit problems experienced by 
Australian banks? These banks are generally considered to have performed much better during the 
GFC than their global counterparts:  the sector showed continued profitability and adequate 
capitalisation, and the four major banks retained their AA ratings. Nonetheless, an examination of 
aggregated impaired assets and provisions for Australian banks shows that impaired assets 
increased from 0.19 per cent to 0.95 per cent (fivefold) and provisions from 0.38 per cent to 0.69 
per cent (nearly double) over the 24 months ended March 2009. This shows that credit risk has not 
stayed the same, a conclusion supported by a drop in bank share prices of 58 per cent during the 
GFC. Clearly the customer-only models are not reflecting this. The (approximate) trebling in VaR 
and CVaR estimates given by the iTransition model seems reasonably consistent with the increase 
in provisions and impaired assets of the banks. The structural model also highlights an increase in 
risk, although in line with KMV observations. We note that whilst DD may be accurately reflected, 
PD values derived from the DD using a normal distribution are questionable (converting DD to PD 
shows almost no risk before or after the GFC, which is clearly understated, whereas CPD is 29 per 
cent during the GFC, which appears highly overstated).   
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Table 9 
Summary of Outcomes 
 
The table provides a summary of the extent of changes in credit-risk measurements 
of Australian banks, as presented in detail on pages 14-23. A * indicates significance at the 95 
per cent level and ** significance at the 99 per cent level.  
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The models investigated produced very different results. Customer-based models, including the 
Basel model and the undiversified transition model, showed very little change in overall credit risk 
or industry credit risk with the advent of the GFC. Market-based models showed a significant 
increase in risk during the GFC as compared to prior years, particularly using CVaR (or CDD), and 
also showed shifts in relative risk between industries. The customer-based models seem not to 
adequately recognise the fluctuations in the market value of assets and how these can differ among 
industries, whereas the market-based models can recognise them.  
Overall, the increased risk shown by the market-only models is far more consistent with 
banks' actual increases in impaired assets and provisions (as discussed above) than the no-change 
position shown by the customer-only models. Customer-only models tend to be static, as they 
measure credit risk at a point in time and review ratings only periodically (often annually). Output 
from models that incorporate asset-value fluctuations can be updated regularly, even daily if 
required.  This is important to banks, as these values provide early warning of deteriorating credit 
risk.  
Analysis of individual customer circumstances is, of course, essential to understanding 
credit risk; we also note that PDs can be understated or overstated by the heavily market-weighted 
structural model, whereas this problem is not evident in the more balanced customer-market 
iTransition model. We conclude that analysis of both customers and markets is important to credit-
risk measurement, and a two-factor market-customer approach is recommended. The customer 
component allows banks to measure and provide for individual customer circumstances, and the 
market component gives banks a means of early risk detection and lets them measure and provide 
for fluctuating economic circumstances. As discussed in the contribution and benefits section of this 
paper, this is essential so that banks are not left scrambling for capital in downturns.   
 
Model
Customer- 
or market- 
based
Indicated 
change in 
credit risk Extent of change
Significance 
of change in 
industry 
rankings
Basel Customer Very small
Increase in capital requirement from 
3.08% to 3.31%
-
Undiversified 
transition Customer Very small
Increase in VaR from 0.0242 to 0.0306 
and CVaR from 0.0342 to 0.0396
-
iTransition
Market 
(balanced) Large
Increase in VaR from 0.0242 to 0.0762 
and CVaR from 0.0342 to 0.0921
*
Structural Market Large
Reduction in DD from 8.54 to 4.37 and 
CDD from 4.95 to 0.56
**
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